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Knowledge-How is the Norm of Intention 
 
Skipper is having his French neighbours over for lunch. In order to impress them he 
decides to make Coq au Vin in a traditional French rustic style. He informs his neighbours about 
his plan, buys all the required ingredients, and gets up early to make the dish. But disaster 
strikes! Skipper realises that he does not know how to make coq au vin; let alone in the rustic 
style! In frustration he changes his plan, and cobbles together a cottage pie. His guests leave 
disappointed. 
 
Skipper’s plan is clearly criticisable, but why? Making Coq au Vin does not seem 
practically irrational. Making an authentic French dish is a good way to impress your French 
neighbours, meaning that Skipper’s intention was supported by his reasons. Skipper might well 
also know his reasons, meaning that he cannot be criticised for his epistemic position regarding 
his practical reasoning. Coq au vin is also not a difficult dish to make – providing you know the 
recipe – meaning that the dish was within Skipper’s power to make. Skipper didn’t intend to do 
something beyond his physical capabilities. 
 
In this paper, I want to make the case that Skipper’s intention is criticisable because he 
didn’t know how to do what he intended to do. I will be arguing that there is a normative 
connection between knowledge-how and intention, with something like the following form: 
 
KNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
I will call this norm the Knowledge-How Norm on Intention (KNI).1 KNI is intended to 
parallel the much-discussed knowledge norms on assertion, belief and practical action, which 
                                                          
1KNI is related to the following necessity claim: 
 
K: If A is doing V intentionally, then A knows how to V 
 
(Anscombe 1957, p.83; Stanley & Williamson 2001, pp.442–3; Gibbons 2001, pp.597–8; Setiya 2008, 
p.404; Stanley 2011, pp.185–90; Hornsby 2016). KNI is distinct from K: K states a necessary conditions on 
 2 
claim that knowledge is the condition on epistemically appropriate assertion, belief and action 
respectively (Williamson 2000; Hawthorne 2003; Sutton 2007; Hawthorne & Stanley 2008; Bach 
2008; Fantl & McGrath 2009). However, I will think of KNI as a norm of rationality rather than a 
specifically epistemic norm. Because merely having knowledge-how is not sufficient for having a 
rational intention, I will also only be arguing only for the necessity direction of the norm. 
 
This proposal is not entirely novel. Setiya claims that forming an intention to V is only 
epistemically justified when one knows how to V, because knowledge-how provides epistemic 
entitlement for the beliefs involved in intentional action (Setiya 2008: 406-9, 2012: 300-4)).2 
Stanley also employs an analogy between acting unskilfully and acting on the basis of ignorance 
to explore similarities between the debate about the condition which is the norm of action and 
the conditions required for skill (Stanley 2011: 175-81), which suggests that he endorses a 
normative connection between knowledge-how and action.3 KNI is also connected to 
Buckwalter and Turri’s proposal that knowledge-how is the norm of showing (Buckwalter and 
Turri 2014).4 Acknowledging that KNI has important relations to debates about the 
epistemology of intention, the nature of knowledge-how, and other epistemic norms, I want to 
put these issues to one side, and focus on making the case for KNI. I also want to bracket 
debates about the nature of knowledge-how and intention. The goal is to argue for the 
structural claim that whatever knowledge-how and intention turn out to be, they are 
connected by a norm of rationality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
acting, whereas KNI expresses a norm on intending. If we deny that there is a distinction between 
intending and acting (Thompson 2008; Moran and Stone 2011; Ferrero, MS.), KNI is incompatible with K. 
However, if intentional action starts soon as one forms an intention, K is implausible.  
2 See also (Paul 2009b; Setiya 2009; 2016). 
3 Stanley suggests that acting without skill involves norm violation, and he takes it that skill requires 
know-how (2011, p.175) giving: 
 
KNA: One must: V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
Because KNA is a norm on acting rather than intending, it incompatible with K (see footnote 1). 
4 For criticism of the knowledge-how norm of showing, and discussion of the relation between the 
showing norm and KNI, see (Habgood-Coote 2017) (note that in this paper the acronym for the 
knowledge-how norm of intention is INT). 
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In the first section, I set out the case for KNI, showing that the arguments used for other 
knowledge norms can be adapted to the case of intention. In the second section, I clarify this 
norm, work though some problem cases in which it appears that agents can legitimately intend 
without having knowledge-how, and propose a tweak to KNI that connects the epistemic 
requirements on intention to the idea that intentions are partial plans. In the third section, I 
consider alternative conditions that might figure in a norm on intention and argue that they 
lead to unattractive norms. 
 
1. The Case for KNI 
 
In the case of other knowledge-norms, there are a battery of arguments that make the 
case that the relevant activity or state is governed by a knowledge requirement: 
 
i. The naturalness of using knowledge ascriptions to evaluate; 
ii. Conversational phenomena explained by the knowledge-norm; 
iii. The unacceptability of asserting, reasoning from, or believing lottery propositions. 
 
In this section, I show that these arguments can be extended to the case of intending. 
The goal of this section is to establish a cumulative case for KNI based on a range of arguments, 
and not to offer a systematic defence of each these arguments. If you have worries about one 
or two of these phenomena, then there will hopefully be others which convince you. If you 
have worries about all of these arguments, then this section should show you that you have 
one more potential knowledge norm to worry about. 
 
1.1. Evaluative Knowledge-how ascriptions 
 
Knowledge-how ascriptions have various conversational functions. Saying that someone 
knows how can flag them up as a good teacher (Craig 1990, C13), or as a competent 
collaborator (Moore 1997, 173-4; Hawley 2011, 287–90). We also use knowledge-how 
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ascriptions to evaluate intentions. If Skipper explains his misadventure to a friend, it would be 
natural for them to say: ‘why did you plan to make Coq au Vin; you don’t know how to make 
it!’. This kind of evaluation also works prospectively. If I say that I’m planning to build a bike, 
you might ask me: ‘why are you planning to do that? You don’t know how to make a bike!’ 
Similarly for group actions: if Matti and Lisa express their plan to lift a piano up the stairs to 
their new apartment, it would be completely natural for their friends to say ‘that seems like a 
bad plan; you guys don’t know how to safely lift a piano.’  We can even read this kind of 
evaluative knowledge-how ascription into Hawthorne and Stanley’s restaurant case (2008, 
p.571). After Hannah leads Sarah down the wrong street, it would be natural for Sarah to say: 
‘why did you offer to lead? You don’t know how to get to the restaurant!’  
 
This use of knowledge-how ascriptions suggests that knowledge-how is bound up with 
the evaluation of intentions, just as the use of evaluative uses of knowledge-that ascriptions 
suggests a normative connection between knowledge and practical reason and assertion 
(Williamson 2000; Hawthorne & Stanley 2008, pp.572–4; Gerken 2015). This argument is 
suggestive, but I don’t want to place too much weight on it. Knowledge-how is just one of many 
conditions which can be used to evaluate intention.5 We can also appeal to the agent’s abilities, 
their skills, their competences, and so on. Another worry is that it is a bit murky exactly what is 
being evaluated in these ascriptions. On the face of it, these ascriptions negatively evaluate 
intentions. However, one might think that in these cases the evaluation targets the acts that the 
agents are intending to perform, the agents’ cognitive habits, or the agents themselves. In line 
with my general strategy in this section, I take the evidence from evaluative knowledge-how 
ascriptions to be merely suggestive, and won’t try to address these worries. 
 
1.2. Conversational Dynamics 
 
A second argument for KNI comes from conversational phenomena suggesting a 
connection between knowing how and intending. There are four phenomena which are central: 
                                                          
5  See (Brown 2008, p.571). 
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the uses of know-how ascriptions to challenge intentions, to excuse from requests, and to 
solicit action, as well as the existence of analogues to Moorean sentences for intention.  
 
1.2.1. Challenges  
 
Asserting opens the speaker up to epistemic challenges. If S asserts the proposition ‘p’, 
her interlocutors can ask ‘how do you know that p?’, or more directly ‘do you really know that 
p?’. (Unger 1975, pp.263–264; Slote 1979; Williamson 2000, p.252). Similarly, expressing an 
intention opens the agent up to questions about their know-how. If I say ‘I intend to make a 
bike from scratch’, you might ask me ‘how are you going to do that?’, or more directly ‘do you 
know how to make a bike?’ The same goes for other ways of expressing an intention, for 
example ‘I will make a bike’, or ‘I am making a bike’.6  
 
Answering the challenges ‘how will you V?’ and ‘do you know how to V?’ involves 
employing knowledge-how. A positive answer to the direct question ‘do you know how to V?’ 
involves claiming knowledge how to V. Similarly, although the question ‘how will you V?’ 
targets an agent’s plan rather than their knowledge, one can only satisfactorily answer this 
question by expressing knowledge-how. In answering the question of how I will make a bike, I 
will be expressing — or at least purporting to express — my knowledge of how to make a bike. 
Saying that I’ve just made a guess does not answer the challenge; I need to know that my plan 
will be successful. 
 
One might worry that there are ways of answering these challenges without either 
claiming or expressing knowledge-how. If you ask me how I am going to make a bike, I might 
respond by saying ‘I haven’t decided yet’ or ’I’m going to work it out as I go along’.7 Both 
responses involve expressing complex plans which themselves rely on knowledge-how. If I say ‘I 
                                                          
6 Taking a lead from Anscombe we might suggest that intentions are the kinds of things to which the 
question ‘how are you going to do that?’ has application. On the relation between ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ 
questions, see (Hornsby 2005) 
7 Thanks to Ginger Schultheis for this point. 
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haven’t decided yet’, I claim that there are several options for making a bike, and that I have 
know-how relating to each of them. If I say ‘I am going to work it out as I go along’, then I am 
expressing a plan to pick up knowledge as I go along. If I make this response, it would be 
legitimate to raise the further complaint: ‘but you don’t know anything about bikes!’ which 
challenges whether I possess sufficient knowledge to know how to work it out as I go along. 
This suggests that this kind of plan will only be legitimate if I know how to work it out as I go 
along. (I will return to plans to learn in 2.2.) 
 
If knowledge-how is the norm of intention we can nicely explain the felicity of 
responding to expressions of intention with questions that target knowledge-how. If KNI is 
correct, in expressing an intention to V, one represents oneself as having the requisite 
knowledge-how for that intention to be rationally adequate. Asking questions about what one’s 
plans are, or asking directly about knowledge-how can thereby function as challenges to this 
intention, challenging whether it is normatively adequate. 
 
Interestingly, directive speech acts – such as commanding, offering, and advising – also 
open up questions about knowledge-how. If you tell me to make you a macchiato, I can 
respond by asking how to make one, or by observing that I don’t know how to make one.8 The 
same goes for non-commanding directives. If I’m at a dinner party, and you say ‘have an oyster’ 
(meaning to offer me one, not to command: it’s a polite dinner party), I could respond ‘I’m 
sorry, but I don’t know how to eat an oyster’. The standard function of a directive speech act is 
to get someone else to form an intention, which suggests that we can challenge a directive by 
challenge the appropriateness of the intention it aims at. If knowledge-how is the norm of 
intention, then questions about knowledge-how challenge the appropriateness of the directive 
in this way. If the target does not knowledge-how, then the intention which the directive aims 
at is inappropriate, and the directive itself inherits that inappropriateness.9  
                                                          
8 Strictly speaking the parallel question would be ‘do I know how to make a macchiato?’. However, most 
people know what they know how to do, making it more normal to simply deny knowledge. 
9 Directives are typically associated with an asymmetry of power, and it may be that the person issuing 
the directive responds to the challenge by simply ignoring the challenge and reissuing the directive. I 
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If assertoric and directive speech acts play analogous conversational roles — namely: of 
adding propositions to the common ground, and adding tasks to the to-do list (Portner 2007) — 
we get a neat symmetry between the knowledge norms of intention, and assertion. Just as the 
norm of assertion checks updates to the common ground, the norm of intention checks 
updates to the to-do list. 
 
1.2.2. Excuses 
 
One can excuse oneself from a request to answer a question by claiming that one 
doesn’t know the answer: if you ask me how long naked mole rats live, I can respond by saying 
‘I don’t know how long naked mole rats live’ (Turri 2011, p.38). Rather than answering the 
question, this kind of response functions as a kind of excuse from the request to assert. The 
knowledge norm of assertion can nicely explain this kind of excuse, since if an assertion would 
be epistemically inappropriate without knowledge, claiming to not know implies that the 
assertion requested would be inappropriate. We find a similar phenomenon in the case of 
requests to do stuff. If Tariq asks Joan whether she would mow lines into his lawn with her 
lawnmower, Joan could legitimately respond by saying ‘I don’t know how to mow lines into a 
lawn.’ According to the supporter of KNI, Joan’s response functions as an excuse by claiming 
that she is not in a position to form a appropriate intention to mow lines into Tariq’s lawn. 
 
1.2.3. Soliciting 
 
Questions about knowledge can also function as indirect requests to perform certain 
kinds of action. The question ‘do you know what the capital of Mali is?’ can function as a 
request to make an assertion addressing the question of what the capital of Mali is (Turri 2011, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
don’t think that this detracts from the inappropriateness of the intention which may be formed. Just as 
someone in a position of power can use their authority to override moral norms, they can use this 
authority to override rules of rationality. Cases of knowingly overriding KNI raise the tricky issue of 
whether it is possible to knowingly flout KNI, or whether knowing that you don’t know how to do 
something makes it impossible to form a full intention (as opposed to an intention to try). 
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p.38). This phenomenon fits into a wider phenomenon in which asking a question about 
normative or necessary conditions for some action can function as an indirect request to 
perform that action (Searle 1979; McGlynn 2014, p.93). 
 
We also find cases in which a question about knowledge-how functions as a request to 
form an intention. We are interested in cases of requests to intend, rather than requests to do, 
because KNI is a norm on intending, not on acting.10 If Baird and Jana are going on a drive, and 
Baird is worried that he might get a migraine, making him unable to drive, he might ask Jana ‘do 
you know how to drive a manual?’. In this case, this question functions not as a request to drive 
— Baird wouldn’t expect Jana to get in on the driver’s side straight away— but rather as a 
request to form the intention to drive if he gets a migraine. Similarly, if Hailey is looking for 
someone to climb with when she’s recovered from an injury in six months time, she might ask 
Daman ‘do you know how to climb?’ meaning not to ask him to climb, but rather to form the 
intention to go climbing with her once she has recovered. If knowledge-how is the norm of 
intending, then these requests to form intentions fit nicely into the wider phenomenon of 
indirect requests based on questions about normative conditions. 
 
1.2.4. Moorean Sentences 
 
Moorean sentences for knowledge provides another argument for the knowledge norm 
of assertion (Williamson 2000, pp.254–5). The sentence ‘p, but I don’t know that p’ seems 
bizarre to assert. According to the supporter of the knowledge-norm of assertion, this is 
because employing this sentence involves asserting a proposition, whilst claiming that one is 
not in an adequate epistemic position to assert it.  
 
There are various candidates for a Moorean sentence for intention: 
 
                                                          
10 See footnote 3. Questions about know-how functioning as requests to act can also be explained by the 
hypothesis that knowledge-how is necessary for action, making these cases less useful in arguing for 
KNI. Thanks to Marissa Wallin for this point. 
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1.  I intend to V, but I don’t know how to V. 
2.  I will V, but I don’t know how to V. 
3.  I am V-ing, but I don’t know how to V. 
 
Some of these sentences seem bad: 
 
4.  I intend to find a hyacinth on my walk today, but I don’t know how to recognise 
one. 
5.  I will perform a salchow tomorrow, but I don’t know how to do a salchow 
6.  I am making a computer program for finding nth roots, but I don’t know how to 
code 
 
However, others seem acceptable: 
 
7. I intend to make a bike, but I don’t know how to make one. 
8. I will prune your apple tree, but I don’t know how to prune. 
9. I am taking us to the restaurant, but I don’t know how to get there. 
 
It seems to me that the difference in acceptability comes down to whether it is possible 
to learn how as one goes along. It isn’t possible to learn how to recognise hyacinths simply by 
looking at plants, but it is possible to learn to make a bike from scratch by muddling through 
exercising general problem solving skills. Sentences 8 and 9 also seem to carry the implicature 
that the agent intends to learn how to do the relevant activity, inviting a parenthetical ‘yet’ on 
the end of each sentence. In response to an utterance of any of these sentences, it would be 
natural to ask ‘so when do you intend to learn?’ The hypothesis that knowledge-how is the 
norm of intention is nicely placed to explain the baldness of sentences 4, 5, and 6. Cases in 
which an agent’s plan includes the intention to learn remain puzzling, but I will postpone 
discussion until 2.2.. 
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1.3. Lottery Intentions 
 
A final argument for knowledge norms stems from the unacceptability of asserting, 
believing, or reasoning from lottery propositions. (We’ll focus on assertion). It is no surprise 
that it is epistemically amiss to assert that you have won a fair lottery, if the result has been 
drawn but not announced. If there are a reasonable number of tickets then winning a fair 
lottery is unlikely, meaning that a belief that you have won is unjustified, and most likely false. 
However, the interesting case is the fact that there is something amiss in asserting that you 
have lost a fair lottery. With enough tickets, the probability of losing may be rather high, which 
means that it is possible to have a justified belief that one has lost. However, one cannot know 
that one has lost (plausibly because the belief that one has lost is unsafe). The supporter of a 
knowledge norm can explain the inappropriateness of asserting that one has lost, whereas the 
supporter of other norms – such as truth, belief or justification norms – cannot, meaning that 
Lottery propositions give the knowledge norm one up on its competitors (Williamson 2000, 
C11; Hawthorne 2003, 21–36; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, 572).  
 
We find the same pattern with intentions related to lotteries. An intention to win a 
lottery is inappropriate.  One can explain this by appealing to knowledge-how — since one 
cannot know how to win a fair lottery (Gibbons 2001, pp.287–9; Setiya 2012, pp.286–7). 
However, there are various alternative explanations for the badness of this intention: buying 
the winning ticket in a large fair lottery is overwhelmingly unlikely, meaning that one ought to 
have low credence in the proposition that one will win.11 As with assertion, the interesting case 
is the intention to lose the lottery. An intention to lose will be overwhelmingly likely to be 
successful, and one ought to have a high degree of credence in the proposition that one has 
lost. Nonetheless, there is something extremely strange about intending to lose the lottery.  In 
normal cases, intending to lose is strange because the outcome of one’s ticket being a loser has 
negative value. However, it is easy to set up cases where losing the lottery has positive value: 
                                                          
11 Furthermore, in most real-world lotteries buying a lottery ticket has negative expected value because 
the cost of a ticket is larger than the value of the prize divided by the number of tickets. In a case where 
the value of the prize is sufficiently large, buying a lottery ticket can be practically rational.  
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say if a losing lottery ticket functions as an entry pass to the Lottery Losers party, the value of 
which outweighs the cost of a lottery ticket. 
 
To see the inappropriateness of an intention to lose in the case where losing has 
positive value, consider the following argument: 
 
If I lose the Lottery, I’ll be invited to the special Lottery Losers party 
The Losers party will be a lot of fun 
So, I’ll lose the Lottery  
 
The premises of this argument are true, and it is an instance of a valid schema. These 
premises might also be known, avoiding violations of the knowledge-that norm of practical 
reasoning. Nonetheless, forming the intention expressed by the conclusion of this syllogism is 
obviously inappropriate.12 We cannot explain the inappropriateness of this intention by 
appealing to the low chance of losing the lottery, or a low credence in the proposition that one 
will lose, since I know that it is very likely that I will lose. However, we can explain it by 
appealing to the knowledge-how norm. Despite the overwhelming likelihood of losing one 
cannot know how to lose a fair lottery, because it’s just not something one has any control 
over. Hence, even when one employs a sound argument, and the value of having a losing ticket 
is positive, lack of knowledge how makes an intention to lose the lottery inappropriate. 
 
In this section, we have seen that the phenomena which supporters of knowledge 
norms of belief, assertion, and action appeal to also occur in the case of intention. Although 
there is considerably more to be said about each of these phenomena, the combination of 
these phenomena provides a plausible cumulative argument for the knowledge-how norm of 
intention. 
 
2 The Knowledge-How Norm of Intention 
                                                          
12 Although it would be appropriate to intend to buy a ticket. 
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The phenomena in the previous section support the simple norm stated in the 
introduction: 
 
KNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows how to V. 
 
In this section I will address some problem cases for this norm, including cases of 
intending to work things out as one goes along. I will consider a number of fixes for these cases, 
and offer a revised account of the knowledge-how requirements on intention which appeals to 
partial plans.  
 
Before we consider the problems cases, I will make some observations about the 
normative significance of KNI, and distinguish it from some related principles relating to 
intention. 
 
2.1. Clarifications 
 
KNI claims that at any time at which one is in the state of intending to V, one better also 
be in the state of knowing how to V. KNI evaluates intentions prospectively: one violates this 
norm if one forms an intention to V without knowing how to V even if one picks up this 
knowledge before the time of action. If one intends to V and only later learn how to V, then the 
intention becomes appropriate at the time of learning, but it remains inappropriate before this 
time. KNI can seem overly conservative, requiring considerable knowledge before one intends. 
 
KNI is not violated if one merely intends to try to V. Trying to V is just another of activity 
which can be substituted into KNI, meaning that an intention to try to V requires knowing how 
to try to V, rather than knowing how to V. I might know how to try to dress fashionably, without 
knowing how to dress fashionably, meaning that by the lights of KNI I ought only form the 
intention to try to dress fashionably. 
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KNI can also be overridden by other kinds of considerations. In a case in which an 
intention not accompanied by know-how is morally required, the supporter of KNI is committed 
to saying that there is something rationally inappropriate about that intention, although it is all 
things considered rational.13 In the case of other knowledge-norms, it is common to fix in on 
the evaluation given by the knowledge norm by considering a distinctively epistemic sense of 
evaluation. I find it difficult to isolate an epistemic sense of evaluation of intentions, and will 
stick with the claim that KNI is a norm of rationality. I will also remain neutral on whether KNI is 
a constitutive norm of intention, since resolving this issue would require making substantive 
commitments about the nature of intention. 
 
2.1. Situating KNI 
 
KNI has close relations to several other principles relating to intending: the ought-
implies-can principle, principles of instrumental rationality, and the knowledge norm of 
practical reasoning. Although it is tempting to think that KNI can be reduced to one or other of 
these norms, it is distinct from each of them. 
 
The ought-implies-can principle claims that the actions which we ought to perform are 
ones which we can perform, meaning that it connects ought facts to facts about an agent’s 
practical situation. However, the ought implies can principle is a necessity claim about ought-
facts, and not a norm on intending. KNI is also a principle about intentions in general, not just 
acts which we ought to perform. If I form the intention to break a promise not to ride a bike – 
something I ought not do – and do not know how to ride a bike, according to KNI my intention 
is rationally deficient. This is a case on which the ought-implies-can principle is silent. 
Furthermore, the literature on the relationship between knowledge-how and ability provides us 
                                                          
13 KNI can also be overridden by practical considerations. If I don’t know how to climb a 6c rated climb, 
but want to get halfway up, the best way to buttress my resolve might be to form the intention to climb 
the whole way up. This is a case involving practical reasons to break a norm of rationality. Thanks to 
Michael Wheeler and Philip Ebert for this point. 
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with a plethora of examples in which knowledge-how and ability come apart (Bengson and 
Moffett 2011), suggesting that know-how and ability requirements are distinct (see 3.5. below). 
 
The principle of Instrumental Rationality claims when we intend an end, we must also 
intend what we believe to be the necessary means to that end.14 It is true that exercising 
knowledge-how is an important source of means-ends beliefs. Nonetheless, Instrumental 
Rationality comes apart from KNI. One can have knowledge-how, have beliefs about the 
necessary means to one’s ends, but still not form the appropriate intentions concerning those 
means, fulfilling KNI whilst being means-ends incoherent. One can also be means-ends 
coherent whilst lacking knowledge-how. I might lack knowledge how to achieve some end, have 
a false belief about how to achieve this end, and intend to pursue this (false) means. 
Alternatively, I might lack knowledge how, guess about how to achieve the end, luckily get it 
right, and form a true intention which is in line with that luckily true belief. 
 
The knowledge norm of practical reasoning (KNPR for short) claims that we must know 
the premises of our practical reasoning: 
 
KNPR: One must: employ p as a premise in practical reasoning, only if one knows that 
p.15 
 
This norm does entail that practical reasoning requires some know-how. If one employs 
a means-ends premise in practical reasoning, KNPR claims that one must know that means-ends 
proposition. On the assumption that knowledge of a means-end proposition can suffice for 
knowledge-how,16 this means that KNPR requires knowledge-how relating to the premises of 
practical reasoning. Consider the following piece of practical reasoning: 
 
                                                          
14 (Broome 1999, 2005, 2013; Bratman 1987; Bratman 2009a; 2009b; Setiya 2007; Schroeder 2009). 
15 (Hawthorne 2003; Williamson 2005; Hawthorne & Stanley 2008). On the distinction between norms 
concerning treating as a reason versus employing as a premise, see (McGlynn 2014, p.132). 
16 This claim is compatible with Anti-Intellectualism, see (Hornsby 2005, especially 113) 
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Maia needs cheering up 
Making Maia a hot chocolate will cheer her up 
So, I’ll make Maia a hot chocolate 
 
KNPR requires that I know that making Maia a hot chocolate is a way to cheer her up 
meaning that in order to engage in this practical reasoning I must know how to cheer Maia up. 
However, the requirement made by KNPR is distinct to that made by KNI. In the above case, KNI 
requires knowing how to make a hot chocolate, rather than one knowing how to cheer Maia up. 
Whereas KNPR requires that one have knowledge-how relating to the premises of practical 
reasoning, KNI requires that one have knowledge-how relating to the conclusion of practical 
reasoning.17 
 
2.2. Problem Cases for KNI 
 
There are a number of cases that cause problems for KNI: i) intentions to work out how 
to do something as you go along, ii) intentions to practice, and iii) intentions concerning life 
plans. 
 
The prospective character of the knowledge-how norm of intention means that it 
demands that if we intend to do something, we know how to do it when we form that 
intention. As suggested by our discussion of excuses and Moorean sentences above, one might 
think that there is an easy way to get out of this demand. When one forms the intention to do 
something, one can simply form the additional intention to acquire the requisite know-how 
before the time of action. If Kieran does not know how to dance the Tango, and forms the 
                                                          
17 Another way to attempt to reduce KNI to KNPR is via the idea that knowledge how to V is an enabler 
(Dancy 2004, 38–43). If enablers are among the premises of practical reasoning, and knowledge-how is 
an enabler, then KNPR predicts that practical reasoning requires knowing that one knows how (see 3.6 
below), which entails the knowledge-how norm since second-order knowledge of knowledge entails 
knowledge. However, the claim that knowledge how to V is an enabler for reasons for V-ing is 
implausible. Consider the case of learning to dance the tango (given below in 2.2.). In this case Kieran 
has reasons to dance the Tango despite not knowing how to dance the Tango. Thanks to Kieran Setiya 
for discussion. 
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intention to dance the Tango at his wedding in six months time, we might think that he can 
avoid inappropriateness by forming the supplementary intention to learn how to dance the 
Tango before his wedding (Setiya 2008, p.406).18 Appropriate intentions to V which are 
accompanied by ignorance about how to V, and an intention to learn how to V are 
counterexamples to KNI.19  
 
A second kind of problem case concerns practicing. Knowledge-how is associated with 
various distinctive kinds of learning (Ryle 2009: 30-1) including practicing, whereby one engages 
in an activity to learn how to do it. According to KNI, when one intends to practice V-ing, that 
intention is inappropriate, since the point of practice is to gain knowledge-how.20 This is a 
strange result, meaning that for activities that require practice, the only way to get oneself in a 
position where one’s intentions are appropriate according to KNI is to repeatedly form 
intentions that break that very norm. This would be bad enough if practicing was just a brief 
stage at the beginning of the life-cycle of a skill. However, the importance of continuous 
improvement to skilful activity (Ericsson 2006; Montero 2016, C6) means that practicing is an 
important part of all levels of skill, meaning that KNI predicts a host of norm violations 
associated with any level of skilled activity. 
 
A final problem concerns life-plans. Many life-plans will involve such complex and long-
term plans that no-one can properly claim to know how to pull them off when they form the 
plan.21 A new parent cannot claim to know how to cope with the many and varied challenges 
which can occur during the course of ten or twenty years of a child’s life, but it seems 
appropriate for them to intend to bring up their child to be a happy, flourishing person. It is 
easy to multiply examples of this kind: staying faithful to a partner for a lifetime, living a 
                                                          
18 See (Hawley 2003, pp.9–20; Setiya 2012, p.297) 
19 Setiya suggests that in this case the agent really intends to learn to dance the tango meaning that 
their intentions are consistent with KNI (if they know how to learn the Tango). Paul points out (2009b, 
p.556) this description of Kieran’s intentions is rather strained: it seems much more plausible that Kieran 
both intends to learn, and to dance the Tango, and that he has the first intention because he has the 
second. 
20 (Setiya 2009, n.23) 
21 Thanks to Jessica Brown for raising this worry. 
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worthwhile and fulfilling life, or taking care of another human being are all activities which no-
one – except perhaps people at the end of their lives – has a claim to know how to do. KNI 
seems committed to saying that many life-structuring intentions are inappropriate, which 
seems like a bad result. 
 
2.3. Potential Fixes for KNI 
 
There are several possible responses to these cases.  
 
A hard-nosed option is to stick with the evaluations given by KNI, and say that in the 
above cases our intuitive judgements are tracking a different dimension of evaluation of 
intentions. For example, perhaps intentions to practice are always inappropriate, as KNI 
predicts, it’s just that we allow this inappropriateness because it is in pursuit of the 
epistemically worthwhile goal of gaining more knowledge-how. Although there is something to 
be said for this line, it would be a considerable cost of KNI if the kinds of intentions in the 
previous section have something inappropriate about them. 
 
A slightly more concessive response is to say that in the above cases full intentions are 
inappropriate, although intentions to try are appropriate. This seems like a plausible line for 
intentions to practice. When a novice in some activity is practicing some activity for the first 
time, she should be open to the possibility that she will fail. It would be strange to be practicing 
giving a philosophy talk perfectly, and to make plans based on the assumption that one will 
perform it perfectly first time. One should intend to merely try, and form back-up plans 
conditional on messing up. We might say something similar about experts who are practicing 
new skills. However, this line is less plausible in some of the other problem cases: it seems 
strange to say that Kieran is intending to only try to dance the Tango at his wedding, or that we 
only form intentions to try to achieve our life goals. 22 
                                                          
22 Another related move is to endorse is a graded norm, which claims that the strength of one’s 
intention ought to match one’s degree of knowledge-how. For example, we might connect Holton’s 
notion of partial intention (2008), to partial knowledge-how (Pavese 2017) giving us: 
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Another option is to appeal to contextual dependence in the condition involved in the 
norm to yield a theory where the appropriateness of intention varies depending on contextual 
features. There are a number of possible contextualist theses about knowledge-how, 23 but one 
view that can do some interesting work is the task-indexed contextualism suggested by Hawley 
(2003, pp.21–22). Hawley suggests that knowledge-how ascriptions are made relative to a 
contextually supplied set of tasks, the idea being that for ‘S know how to V’ to be true in some 
context, S needs to know how to perform the set of V-related tasks salient in that context. This 
allows us to say in some contexts – ones where learning is a salient task – merely knowing how 
to learn is be sufficient to count as knowing how to do. If learning how to speak Russian is a 
salient task in a particular context, someone who knows that one can speak Russian by taking a 
class, can be truthfully said to know how to speak Russian, (Hawley 2003, pp.19–20). 
 
Putting this contextualist view of knowledge-how together with KNI gives us a view 
according to which the conditions on appropriate intention vary by context. If the salient tasks 
are easy or few in number, it doesn’t take much knowledge to have an appropriate intention, 
but if the salient tasks are hard or numerous, one needs more knowledge. And if learning is a 
salient task, then knowing how to learn is sufficient to know how, and thus to appropriately 
intend. Although this line promises to gets the right result about the appropriateness of 
Kieran’s intentions, it faces a number of problems. The contextualist explanation of the Tango 
case relies on learning the Tango being a salient task in our conversational context. But, it is 
difficult to see why all of the contexts in which we say Kieran’s intention is appropriate should 
have this feature. In fact, when I introduced the Tango example above, I did not make learning 
to dance the Tango salient, meaning that we made the judgement that Kieran did not know 
how to dance the Tango. However, we still judged that Kieran’s intention was appropriate, 
suggesting that our judgements about the appropriateness of his intention was not tracking the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
PKNI: One must: have a partial intention to V, only if one knows at least in part how to V.  
 
Setiya also alludes to a graded norm (2016, pp.12–13) involving degrees of belief. 
23 (Hawley 2003; Bhatt 2006; Braun 2006; 2011; Parent 2014) 
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contextually salient tasks. Although it is plausible that knowledge-how ascriptions are context-
sensitive, this context-sensitivity does not solve the problems for KNI. 
 
2.4. Knowledge-how and Partial Plans 
 
I think appealing to intentions to try nicely explains intentions to practice. However, to 
explain the appropriateness intending to work things out, and intentions regarding life-plans I 
will connect KNI with Bratman’s idea that intentions are partial plans.24 
 
Bratman points out that when we form intentions, our plans are typically rather coarse-
grained and partial, leaving various practical issues open to be decided later on (Bratman 1987). 
When I form the intention to make lasagne for dinner, I leave open what kind of lasagne to 
make, how to cook the different parts of the dish, and what time to start cooking. I will fill in 
these holes in my plan when I have enough situational knowledge to make an informed 
judgement about which more fine-grained plan to pursue. The idea of filling in helps to 
understand Kieran’s plan: his initial coarse-grained plan which leaves open how he will dance 
the tango gets filled in by an intention concerning how to get himself in a position to dance the 
Tango. 
 
It is plausible that the epistemic requirements on an intention vary depending on how 
filled in one’s intention is.25 Consider the way in which plans for making a lasagne vary 
depending on the cook’s culinary know-how. An experienced cook can plan to make a lasagne 
without needing to plan ahead, leaving open a host of practical issues to be filled in later, 
whereas a more inexperienced cook will need to make a detailed plan which fills in the details 
of her plan. I suggest that the experienced cook’s know-how puts her in a position to fluidly fill 
in a coarse-grained plan by exercising her knowledge how to perform various culinary tasks, 
                                                          
24 Thanks to Justin Snedegar for discussion. 
25 We can find this idea in Bratman: “Of course, means-end coherence does not require that my plans 
specify what I am to do down to the last physical detail. Rather, my plans will typically be at a level of 
abstraction appropriate to my habits and skills.”  (Bratman 1987, 31) 
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whereas the inexperienced cook’s knowledge does not put her in a position to fill out her plans 
as she goes along, meaning that she needs to make a detailed plan ahead of time which goes 
down to the level of her knowledge-how. 
 
To explain this idea, we can build a connection between know-how and partial plans 
into the know-how norm, relativising the know-how norm to the open issues in an agent’s 
plan.26 This gives us the following norm: 
 
KNI-PP: One must: intend to V, leaving open a set of how-to issues {how to V1, how to 
V2, … how to Vn} only if for all of the open how-to issues in that set one knows how to 
perform those tasks.27 
 
This revised norm is able to explain both the cases of intending to work things out as 
one goes along, and the cases of intentions relating to life plans. 
 
In the case of intending to V when one forms the intention to work out how to V whilst 
ignorant about how to V, I suggest we should think of the supplementary intention as filling in 
the partial plan. The initial coarse-grained plan – to V – gets filled in by some more complex 
plan – learn to V, then exercise this knowledge. This more complex plan does not leave open 
the issue of how to V, but rather the issue of how to learn to V, so requires knowledge how to 
learn to V, rather than knowledge how to V. This is the result that we want in these cases: an 
intention to work it out as you go along requires less know-how, but it still requires some 
knowledge.  
 
                                                          
26 This idea is even more attractive if we think of partial plans as question-relative (Snedegar MS), since 
if we think of a partial plan as leaving open practical questions the knowledge-how requirements will be 
knowledge of the answers to those practical questions. 
27 Coarse-grained plans will also involve open issues involving other wh-questions. If I am cooking 
lasagne I might leave open when to start cooking. Many of these will be closely related to how issues. If I 
leave open when to start cooking, I better know how to plan my cooking to finish by dinner-time. 
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In the case of life plans, I suggest that we should think of a plan to bring up a happy child 
not as extraordinarily coarse-grained plan — which would require a great deal of know-how — 
but rather as a policy (Bratman 1987, 56–57). 28 Policies have a conditional structure which 
allow us to affect our future behaviour in predictable ways without knowing much about future 
circumstances. For example, a policy to give up smoking will involve a plan like: if there is an 
opportunity to smoke, then I won’t take it. A parent’s plan to bring up a happy child involves a 
bundle of conditional intentions: if I have a decision to make, I’ll put my child first; if there’s an 
opportunity to find out about how to bring up my child, I’ll take it; and if my child isn’t happy, I’ll 
review my parenting practices.29 The crucial point is that these conditional plans leave open 
smaller issues than a coarse grained plan to bring up a happy child, requiring only knowing how 
to follow the conditional plans, rather than how to bring up a child.  
 
One might worry that allowing agents to avoid negative evaluation by learning how to V 
makes the knowledge-how norm overly permissive.30 Although it is true that KNI-PP is more 
lenient than KNI in evaluating cases involving policies and intentions to learn, this norm is still 
fairly stringent. KNI-PP allows that if one does not know how to V, it is still possible to intend to 
V in accordance with the knowledge-how norm supposing that: one fills out one’s intention 
with a more fine-grained plan to learn to V, then V, and that one knows how to learn to V. 
However, it remains possible to flout this norm either: i) by not forming the more fine-grained 
plan, or ii) by being ignorant about how to learn to V. These restrictions are not trivial. In many 
cases, forming the more fine-grained plan will not be a realistic option, because learning to V is 
either impossible has practical costs, or would simply take up too much time. Knowing how to 
learn to do something is also not automatic. It is true that I know how to learn to do a great 
many things, but there are also many things which I do not know how to learn to do. For 
example, I know how to learn how to run a sub 4.00 hour marathon – find any running coach, 
and ask them how to do it – but I don’t know how to learn how to run a sub 2.30 hour 
                                                          
28 Thanks to Caroline Touborg for this suggestion. 
29 For simplicity, I focus on policies suited to single parenting. The two parent case will involve more 
complex policies. 
30 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
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marathon, because I don’t know how to distinguish coaches with a sufficient level of teaching 
skill to teach me how to train to run that quickly (independently of whether I have the physical 
capacities to do run that quickly).31 
 
The overall lesson of this section is that to tell what the epistemic conditions on 
intention are, we need to know quite a bit about the structure of intentions. I suggested that 
practicing ought to involve merely intending to try to succeed, meaning that one can intend to 
practice, without know how to succeed, as long as one knows how to try. I have claimed that 
intentions to work out how to do something involve forming fine-grained intentions to fill in 
one’s partial plan, and offered a tweaked norm (KNI-PP) which makes the epistemic 
requirements on intention relative to the open issues in the partial plan. I have claimed that 
intentions to pursue life-plans plans are policies, and suggested that policies require knowing 
how to follow a bundle of simple conditional plans rather than how to resolve an extremely 
complex practical issue.  
 
3 Alternative Norms on Intention 
In the debates about the norm of belief, assertion, and practical reasoning — which I will 
call for ease the propositional case — the knowledge norm is not the only possible norm on 
intention. In the propositional case, the standard alternative conditions are: truth (Weiner 
2005), safe success (Pelling 2013), belief (Bach and Harnish 1979; Bach 2008), justification, 
(Douven 2006; Lackey 2008; Kvanvig 2011), or various higher-order conditions (Williamson 
                                                          
31 Perhaps I know how to learn how to learn how to run a 2.30 marathon – i.e. I know how to learn how 
to distinguish good and bad running coaches – which would mean that I could legitimately intend to 
learn how to learn how to run a 2.30 marathon The possibility of iterated learning means that it is 
possible to intend to V, despite not knowing how to learn to V, provided that one knows how to learn 
how to learn to V (where V might itself be learning how to do something). Although the possibility of 
iterated learning means that we need to extend the range of activities which are in principle possible to 
intend appropriately, the practical costs of carrying out an iterated intention to learn will be fairly high. 
There might also be activities which are impossible to learn how to do either for particular agents or in 
general. I cannot learn how to train a dragon (or learn how to learn) because there aren’t any dragons. 
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2000, pp.260–3). In this section I develop analogies to each of these conditions, and show that 
the alternatives to a knowledge-how norm on intention face problems. 32 
 
3.1. Success 
 
The analogy to a truth norm in the case of intention would be a success norm of 
intention (SNI): 
 
SNI: One must: Intend to V, only if one Vs 
 
We need to restrict the variable to intentional actions, otherwise the norm would 
positively evaluate success down to deviant causal chains. Even with this restriction, SNI makes 
some rather strange predictions. If form the intention to make a cup of tea, but change my mind 
and have a coffee, then SNI claims that my initial intention is inappropriate. Similarly, if I start to 
make a cup of tea, but get prevented by a sudden intruder, SNI claims my intention was 
inappropriate.33 SNI also does poorly in evaluating the effects of luck. If I form the intention to 
win a fair lottery, and happen to actually win, then SNI claims my initial intention is appropriate, 
which seems like the wrong result. The underlying problem with SNI is that it evaluates 
intentions retrospectively with regards to success, whereas we want our evaluation of the 
appropriateness of intention to function prospectively, so that we can know whether an 
intention was appropriate before we know how things turn out.34 
 
3.2. Safety 
 
                                                          
32 As in the case of knowledge-that, some of these conditions are entailed by others, meaning that 
someone who endorses a particular norm also endorses all of the logically weaker norms (so the 
supporter of a knowledge norm is also committed to a truth norm). When I say that someone supports 
an X norm of intention, I mean that they claim that X is the strongest normative condition on intention. 
33 One way to avoid these problems would be to switch to a no-failures norm, where changing one’s 
mind, and outside interference do not count as failures. 
34 This is not to say that success is irrelevant to the normative evaluation of intentions. Plausibly success 
is the constitutive aim of intention, meaning that only a successful intention will meet its constitutive 
aim. 
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The analogy to a safety norm on assertion (Pelling 2013) would be a safe success norm 
of intention (SSNI): 
 
SSNI: One must: intend to V, only if one could not easily fail to V 
 
SSNI does much better than SNI on cases of lucky success: SSNI predicts that a lucky 
lottery win involves an inappropriate intention, because the success will not by safe. It also gets 
the right result about intentions to lose the lottery: although these intentions are 
overwhelmingly likely to be successful the success will not be safe, because there is a close 
world in which the ticket wins. 
 
However, SSNI is an implausible standard on intentions. There are many ordinary 
intentions which are unsafe (Hawley 2003, pp.23–24). Kayetan is a skilled baker, and knows how 
to bake a perfect loaf of bread, but that does not mean that he always produces a perfect loaf 
— there are just too many variables to get it right every time. This means that even when 
Kayetan bakes a perfect loaf, there is a close world in which something goes wrong, and his 
intention fails.35 Nonetheless, his intention seems appropriate. Although in this case the 
number of failure worlds is fairly small, we might think that we can appropriately intend when 
there are many close failures. Consider cases of difficult action (Marušić 2012; 2015): quitting 
smoking, staying faithful to a partner for a lifetime, or running a first marathon. Plausibly these 
are acts which we can at least sometimes appropriately intend to perform, but involve great 
many close worlds in which we fail because these tasks are extremely challenging.36  
 
3.3. Belief 
 
                                                          
35 One way to avoid this problem is to tweak the safety condition to allow some error possibilities in 
close worlds (Pritchard 2005). However, allowing any errors in close worlds means that SSNI loses its 
explanation of the inappropriateness of intending to lose the lottery. 
36 Since we can know how to perform difficult actions, although our success in them will be unsafe, 
these cases provide counterexamples to the claim that knowing how to V entails safe success in V-ing. 
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The analogous norm to the belief norm is a norm that one believes that one will succeed 
(BNI): 
 
BNI: One must: Intend to V, only if one believes that one will succeed in V-ing 
 
The supporter of BNI can appeal to many of the conversational arguments which 
support KNI; for example, saying ‘do you think that you will succeed in making a soufflé?’ can 
function as a challenge to someone who has just expressed an intention to make a soufflé. 
 
An initial problem for BNI comes from cases in which an agent intends to do something 
without believing that she will. These cases are familiar from the debate about Cognitivism 
about Intention (Bratman 1987: 38-9), (Holton 2008: 28-9). Michael might intend to take a book 
back to the library, but in light of his general absent-mindedness suspend on the question of 
whether he will take the book back, forming a back-up plan to renew the book online if he 
cycles past the library. There seems nothing inappropriate about his intention to take his book 
to the library, although it is not accompanied by the belief that he will succeed.37 
 
Another issue concerns why we should think that mere belief in success is an interesting 
condition for determining the appropriateness of intentions. BNI makes no restrictions on the 
epistemic status of the belief in success, meaning that it predicts that unjustified beliefs based 
on wishful thinking or guesses can render intentions appropriate. I do not appropriately intend 
to climb a difficult bouldering problem just because I wishfully think that I will climb it. 
 
3.4. Justification 
 
                                                          
37 To explain these cases, Holton floats the suggestion of a partial belief norm on intention (Holton 2008, 
pp.56–58) where the notion of partial belief that p is a doxastic state which takes both p and not-p as 
live possibilities. This yields the following norm: 
 
PBNI: One must: intend to V, only if one partially believes that one will succeed at V-ing 
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We might think that the condition for appropriate intention is having justification for 
believing that will succeed (I’ll run with a doxastic justification norm, but one could also work 
with propositional justification, see (Lackey 2008)). This gives us the analogue to a justification 
norm for the case of intention (JBNI): 
 
JBNI: One must: intend to V, only if one has a justified belief that one will succeed in V-
ing 
 
JNBI seems attractive – we might think that there is something seriously amiss with an 
intention to do something which is not accompanied by a justified belief that one will succeed 
(Marušić 2015, C2). However, the question of how we gain epistemic justification for believing 
that we will succeed in our intentions is a hugely controversial one, intersecting with the debate 
about our knowledge of our own actions.38 This means that the predictions of JBNI will depend 
on the account of the justification for believing that one’s intentions will succeed.39 The 
available views of this justification vary drastically in their predictions. On the one hand, there 
are sceptics about practical knowledge, who claim that belief in success is only justified when 
properly based on prior empirical evidence.40 If scepticism turns out to be correct, then JBNI is a 
pretty restrictive norm, claiming that intending to perform difficult action is inappropriate, 
because one will not have sufficient prior empirical evidence to believe in success. One the 
other hand, there are permissivists about practical knowledge, who claim that merely forming 
an intention is sufficient to grant justification to believe that one will succeed, so long as one 
knows that this belief will be true and justified once formed.41 If permissivism is correct, then a 
majority of intentions will be accompanied by justified belief appropriate according to JBNI.  
 
Which view of the justification for belief in success we take also determines whether 
JBNI is a genuine alternative to KNI. Setiya suggests something rather close to KNI, on the basis 
of the thought that knowledge-how grants an epistemic entitlement to the beliefs which are 
                                                          
38 See (Anscombe 1957; Velleman 1989; Moran 2004; Ford et al. 2011).  
39 My discussion here closely follows (Setiya 2016: 12-13) 
40 (Grice 1972; Langton 2004; Paul 2009a) 
41 (Harman 1976, n. 8; Velleman 1989:56–64) 
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tied up with intentional action, including the belief that one’s intention will be successful (Setiya 
2008, pp.206–8; 2012, pp.300–304). On Setiya’s view, having a justified belief that one will V 
requires knowing how to V, meaning that if Setiya’s view is right, then JBNI entails KNI and is not 
an alternative to it.  
 
These considerations do not constitute a direct criticism of JBNI, but they do show that 
the supporter of JBNI needs to make commitments in a contentious debate to fill their account 
out. 
 
3.5. Ability 
 
If knowledge-how and ability come apart, one might think that it is ability which is the 
condition on appropriate intention, giving us an ability norm on intention (ANI):42 
 
ANI: One must: intend to V, only if one is able to V. 
 
The supporter of ANI can also appeal to conversational phenomena in support of their 
norm: ‘can you V?’ is a reasonable challenge to the expression of intention. 
 
One problem concerns how to understand the notion of ability in ANI. In ordinary 
language ‘can’, ‘is able to’, and ‘could’ are extremely context-sensitive  (Kratzer 1977; Lewis 
1996). This means that the states picked out by ordinary language ascriptions will not provide a 
plausible general standard on intention, unless the appropriateness of intention tracks the 
contextual features which determine the meaning of phrases like ‘is able to’, which seems 
unlikely. 
 
The supporter of ANI therefore needs to offer an independent account of the kind of 
ability they are interested in. They have a number of options here, ranging from reliable ability 
                                                          
42 This norm has not been defended in the propositional case, but it behaves something like an objective 
probability norm. 
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to mere physical capacity. All of these options face problems explaining lottery intentions. In 
order to explain the inappropriateness of intending to win the lottery, the supporter of ANI will 
need to plump for something considerably stronger than mere physical capacity, because 
plausibly we do have the physical capacity to win the lottery. However, even a reliable ability 
condition will have trouble explaining the inappropriateness of intending to lose the lottery. 
With a fair lottery, anyone who can buy a ticket has a reliable ability to lose it, but it remains 
inappropriate to intend to lose.  
 
3.6. Higher-order Conditions  
 
In section 1 I argued that the possession of knowledge how is significant for the 
normative status of intention. One way to go along with this idea while resisting KNI is to claim 
that it is our epistemic status regarding our knowledge-how which is the norm on intending. 
One might endorse a higher-order norm, such as a belief that one knows how norm (BKNI), 43 or 
a knowledge that one knows how norm (KKNI): 
 
KKNI: One must: intend to V, only if one knows that one knows how to V. 
 
Our epistemic standing with respect to our knowledge-how does seem significant to the 
evaluation of intentions. Someone who does know how to do something but has strong but 
misleading evidence that they do not seems poorly placed to intend, and someone who does 
not know to do something, but has misleading evidence that they do seems well placed to 
intend. These kinds of worries have also arisen in the propositional case, where they support 
the move from a first-order knowledge norm to a second-order norm (Williamson 2000, 
pp.258–263).  
 
In the propositional case, there are a family of moves available to the supporter of a first 
order norm which allow them to explain the normative significance of the higher order 
                                                          
43 This norm is suggested by Paul, see (Paul 2009, 555). BKNI shares with BNI the problem is that it does 
not distinguish whether the belief is well-supported or not. 
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conditions, without moving to a higher-order norm. These views endorse Separabilism (Boyd 
2015), the view that any norm involves two separate dimensions of evaluation – one concerning 
whether the agent fulfilled or violated the norm, and another concerning whether the agent 
was epistemically well placed with respect to whether they fulfilled the norm. There are a 
number of views about the normative significance of one’s epistemic position with respect to 
having fulfilled an epistemic norm: one might appeal to the idea of excusable norm violation 
(Williamson 2000; Hawthorne & Stanley 2008; Littlejohn 2009), the distinction between agent 
and state or activity evaluation (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014; Williamson forthcoming), or the 
distinction between primary and  secondary propriety (DeRose 2002). Endorsing any of these 
Separabilist views allows the supporter of KNI to claim that in cases of misleading higher-order 
evidence, these two dimensions of evaluation come apart. One might think that in a case where 
an agent intended to do something innocently thinking that they did know how to do it, they 
violated the knowledge-how norm, but did so excusably, with secondary propriety, or whilst 
exercising a good cognitive habit. 
 
With Separabilism on the table the supporter of KNI can explain the importance of 
second-order evidence without endorsing a second-order norm. Given that KNI and KKNI on par 
with respect to the relevance of higher-order evidence, I think that we ought to prefer the 
simpler norm – KNI –  on the grounds that it is more likely that this is the norm governing our 
ordinary interactions of intentions. It is also worth pointing out that endorsing KKNI doesn’t 
release us from the need to appeal to the distinction between norm violation and excusable 
norm violation: just as one can have misleading evidence that one knows-how, one can also 
have misleading evidence that one knows that one knows how.44 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have explored the normative role of knowledge-how in the mental economy, arguing 
that knowledge-how is the norm of intention. I have developed a strong cumulative case for this 
                                                          
44 Another worry is that higher-order knowledge of competence is rare (Kruger & Dunning 1999). 
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norm based on extensions of arguments for other knowledge-norms. Although the simple 
version of the norm (KNI) faces some problems, I have shown that situating this norm within the 
framework of partial plans leads to a more plausible norm (KNI-PP) which is more sensitive to 
the complex structure of intentions. I have also argued that the alternatives to a knowledge-
how norm are unattractive: either facing serious problems, or requiring philosophical 
development to count as a genuine alternative to the knowledge-norm. 
 
This discussion has several interesting upshots: 
 
First, the idea that knowledge-how is the norm of intention illuminates the relation 
between knowledge-how and intentional action. Whereas some writers have stressed the role 
of knowledge-how in guiding intentional action (Kumar 2011), (Cath 2015), and others have 
pushed the idea that knowledge-how is a necessary condition for intentional action (see 
footnote 1), I have suggested that the relation between knowledge-how and intentional action 
is a normative one, and that in order to understand the functional role of knowledge-how we 
need to pay attention to its role in practical reasoning. 
 
Secondly, the knowledge-how norm of intention has potential for illuminating the 
relation between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Just as according to the knowledge 
norm of practical reasoning, we must know the premises of our practical reasoning, according 
to the knowledge-how norm of intention, we must know how to enact the conclusions of 
practical reasoning. The package of both norms both gives unifying explanation of the relation 
between knowledge and practical reasoning,45 and provides a helpful corrective to literature 
which has stressed the differences between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. If knowledge-
how and knowledge-that both play roles in norms governing practical reasoning, this gives us a 
reason for thinking of both states as species of knowledge, despite the apparent differences in 
their epistemic properties. 
 
                                                          
45 This idea mirrors Buckwalter and Turri’s picture of the relation between the knowledge-how norm of 
showing and the knowledge-that norm of assertion (Buckwalter and Turri 2014). 
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Thirdly, the idea that knowledge-how has a normative role to play in practical reasoning 
has some interesting decision-theoretic applications. One way to understand the normative role 
of knowledge in practical reasoning in a decision-theoretic framework is by saying that 
knowledge constrains what states and outcomes we can write in our decision table, and which 
we can leave off (see Weatherson 2012). The knowledge-how norm of intention raises the 
possibility that knowledge-how also has a role to play in constructing our decision tables. The 
natural analogy would be to suggest that just as propositional knowledge constrains the states 
and outcomes that we write a decision table, knowledge-how constrains the options which we 
write in a table.46 Although this idea is distinct from the knowledge-how norm of intention, and 
is not obviously entailed by that norm, it is an intriguing option for developing the role of 
knowledge-how in practical reasoning. 
 
Fourthly, the claim that knowledge-how is the norm of intention can feed into our first-
order discussions of knowledge-how. I have not discussed the question of whether knowledge-
how is a species of propositional knowledge, since I take it that the question of the 
propositionality of knowledge-how is orthogonal to the question of what normative role it 
plays. However, if knowledge-how is the norm of intention, then it is a plausible constraint on 
an account of knowledge-how that it pick out a state which is a plausible candidate for the norm 
on intention.  
 
Finally, the cumulative case for the knowledge-how is the norm of intention provides an 
indirect argument for Setiya’s claim that knowledge-how has a role to play in the dynamic 
epistemology of intention (Setiya 2008, 2009). Although I have remained neutral about the 
normative grounding of the knowledge-how nor (and on the question of whether it is a 
constitutive norm of intending), one way to explain why knowledge-how is the norm of 
                                                          
46 For more on the norms of treating something as an option, see (Hedden 2012; 2015). Thanks to 
Nilanjan Das and Abby Jacques for raising this idea. 
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intention is to appeal to the idea that knowledge-how is a necessary condition on intending to V 
with epistemic propriety.47 
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